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Introduction to the Symposium
“Wittgenstein and Pragmatism: A
Reassessment”
Christiane Chauviré and Sabine Plaud
1 The connections between Wittgenstein’s philosophy and the pragmatist tradition are
often  alluded  to,  but  seldom  thoroughly  explored.  It  is  commonly  assumed  that
Wittgenstein was scarcely acquainted with such authors as Charles Sanders Peirce or
John Dewey  (a  false  idea,  as  we  shall  see),  even  though he  had  a  rather  extended
knowledge of the philosophy of William James. Nevertheless, the converging features
between  Wittgenstein  and  pragmatism  are  quite  striking:  we  shall  hardly  need  to
mention  Wittgenstein’s  claim that  meaning  is  use,  his  insistence  on  the  pictorial
dimension  of  mathematical  proof,  or  again  his  emphasis  on  action  in  his
characterization of will and intention. On the other hand, modern and contemporary
pragmatist philosophers (R. B. Brandom, H. Putnam...) have often developed a complex
and intricate relationship to Wittgenstein’s philosophy, since they sometimes use it as a
support to their own arguments, but sometimes also point at its insufficiencies, and try
to  amend  them.  Hence  the  following  questions:  in  what  sense  may  Wittgenstein’s
philosophy  be  described  as  ‘pragmatist’?  Symmetrically,  in  what  sense  may
contemporary pragmatist philosophy be described as ‘Wittgensteinian’? What are the
incompatibilities,  if  any,  between  these  two  traditions?  Lastly,  what  part  has  been
played by such ‘middlemen’ as C. K. Ogden or F. P. Ramsey in the interactions between
Wittgenstein  and  pragmatism?  Answering  these  questions  should  provide  an
opportunity to explore the dialogues and/or misunderstandings between a European or
continental tradition in philosophy, and a more specifically American analysis of the
notions of meaning, reasoning, action, etc.
2 On one side, to compare Wittgenstein with pragmatism has become a classical topic
since the ‘pragmatist turn’ in American philosophy in the eighties-nineties, and since
the pragmatism’s revival due to such philosophers as Putnam, Rorty or Brandom, to
speak only of the greatest. On the other hand, many British philosophers, more or less
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connected  to  Wittgenstein,  are  self-avowed  pragmatists:  there  is  a  ‘Cambridge
pragmatism’ illustrated by Ramsey, Anscombe, von Wright, Mellor, Blackburn, all  of
them having something to do with pragmatist topics. And Wittgenstein himself, when
he returned to Cambridge in 1929, developed a philosophy that was very different from
the Tractatus, and distinctly pragmatist in its nature.
3 In  this  special  issue,  we  would  like  to  submit  to  our  readers  the  hypothesis  that
Wittgenstein’s return to Cambridge in 1929 was also a pragmatist turn. This event is
often imputed to the acquaintance with Ramsey and Sraffa. But it seems to us that we
could also impute it to his having read Dewey, especially Experience and Nature (1925).
The whole theme of the return of philosophy to the ordinary which permeates the
Philosophical Investigations is probably borrowed from Dewey’s Experience and Nature. The
idea of equating meaning with use, the emphasis on instrumentalism, the quest of the
ordinary, the account that is now taken of the context of language and of the practical
consequences of what is said, the conception of language as a set of deeds makes up an
overwhelming evidence for the similarity between Wittgenstein and Dewey, as well as
for the affinities between Wittgenstein and pragmatism in general.
4 The papers  collected  in  this  issue  browse  the  various  aspects  of  these  connections
between Wittgenstein and pragmatism, by focusing on the necessity to reevaluate such
connections.  In  “A  New  Look  at  Wittgenstein  and  Pragmatism,”  Sami  Pihlström
reconsiders Wittgenstein’s relation to this tradition by discussing three key issues of
Wittgenstein  studies:  the  distinction  between  the  propositional  and  the  non-
propositional; the tension between anti-Cartesian faillibilism and what has been called
the “truth in skepticism” in Wittgenstein; and the relation between metaphysics and
the criticism of metaphysics in Wittgenstein’s philosophy. In her paper: “Who’s Calling
Wittgenstein  a  Pragmatist?,”  Judith  Hensley  addresses  the  debate  that  surrounds
“pragmatic” interpretations of Ludwig Wittgenstein. She draws in particular on Hilary
Putnam’s lecture “Was Wittgenstein a Pragmatist?” and on Stanley Cavell’s response
“What’s  the  Use  of  Calling  Emerson  a  Pragmatist?.”  Anna  Boncompagni’s  paper:
“Streams and River-Beds. James’ Stream of Thought in Wittgenstein’s Manuscripts 165
and 129” focuses on a picture common to Wittgenstein and William James, namely the
image  of  the  flux,  stream,  or  river,  by  referring  to  some  notes  belonging  to
Wittgenstein’s Nachlass. This analysis leads to the theme of the relations among science,
philosophy and metaphysics, and to the conclusion that Wittgenstein did appreciate
James for his intuitions and for the power of his imagination, but could not agree on
the explicit formulation of his ideas. The specific connections between Wittgenstein
and British pragmatism are addressed by Mathieu Marion in “Wittgenstein, Ramsey
and British Pragmatism,” where he examines the transmission of some ideas of the
pragmatist tradition to Wittgenstein, in his “middle period,” through the intermediary
of F. P. Ramsey, with whom he had numerous fruitful discussions at Cambridge in 1929.
Marion argues more specifically that one must first come to terms with Ramsey’s own
views in 1929, and explain how they differ from views expressed in earlier papers from
1925-27. One is then in a better position to understand the impact of Ramsey’s astute
critique  of  Wittgenstein’s  Tractatus  Logico-philosophicus in  conjunction  with  his
pragmatism, and explain how it may have set into motion the ‘later’ Wittgenstein.
5 The  issue  then  proposes  a  series  of  paper  devoted  to  the  relationships  between
Wittgenstein  and  Dewey.  Christiane  Chauviré’s  “Experience  and  Nature.  Wittgenstein
Reader  of  Dewey”  focuses  on  Dewey’s  influence  which  is  seldom mentioned in  the
Introduction to the Symposium “Wittgenstein and Pragmatism: A Reassessment”
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, IV-2 | 2012
2
literature when the relationships between Wittgenstein and pragmatism are addressed.
Yet, it should be known that Dewey’s philosophy is clearly echoed in Wittgenstein’s
later  philosophy,  as  it  is  expressed  in  his  Philosophical  Investigations.  In  particular,
Dewey’s Experience and Nature develops many creeds also taken up by Wittgenstein: for
instance,  the  critical  attitude  towards  artificial  notions  that  break  with  primary
experience (e. g., the “Self”), the will to bring philosophy back to the ordinary, or the
emphasis laid on the necessity to pay attention to what lies open to the view. James
Luntley’s “Training, Training, Training: The Making of Second Nature and the Roots of
Wittgenstein’s  Pragmatism”  is  then  interested  in  the  influence  of  pragmatism  on
Wittgenstein’s conception of practice, and argues that Wittgenstein’s appeal to practice
is much closer to Dewey’s than to Peirce’s. In “Wittgenstein, Dewey, and the Practical
Foundation of Knowledge,” Jorg Völbers compares the philosophies of Wittgenstein and
Dewey  in  their  connection  to  a  theory  of  practice:  Wittgenstein  and  Dewey  both
express a defense of the “primary of practice”; yet, their philosophies are extremely
different in style, and considering those differences may allow us to examine what kind
of knowledge we should expect from philosophy, a question to which Wittgenstein and
Dewey provide very different answers. In “Group Morality and Forms of Life: Dewey,
Wittgenstein and Inter-subjectivity,” Rick Davis tries to establish connections between
the  pragmatist  philosophical  tradition  and  the  later  philosophy  of  Ludwig
Wittgenstein, and argues that among these connections is the affinity between John
Dewey’s account of the development of group morality and Wittgenstein’s concept of
“form of life.”
6 Lastly,  this  issue  addresses  more  contemporary  issues  regarding  the  connections
between Wittgenstein and pragmatism. In “A Philosophical Bestiary,” Joseph Margolis
notices  that  different  readings  have been provided as  for  the  connections  between
Wittgenstein and pragmatism, such as for example H. Putnam’s picture as opposed to
R. Rorty’s description that packages Wittgenstein and Dewey together as ‘postmodern’
pragmatists.  Joseph  Margolis  tries  to  broaden  the  discussion  by  including  an
examination of Wilfrid Sellars, Gottlob Frege, Robert Brandom, and Huw Price. His aim
it to review the newer challenges of naturalism and deflationism, which, by their own
instruction, should bring us to the decisive contest between the ‘pragmatism’ of the
Investigations and that of Brandom’s Between Saying and Doing. The larger purpose of this
exercise is to assess pragmatism’s best prospects currently, in meeting the gathering
challenges  of  the  day.  Guy  Bennett-Hunter’s  paper:  “A  Pragmatist  Conception  of
Certainty: Wittgenstein and Santayana” draws on Duncan Pritchard’s recent reading of
Wittgenstein’s On Certainty, and identifies two important and related points of affinity
between this Wittgensteinian line of thought on certainty and the line of thought on
the same topic articulated in Santayana’s Scepticism and Animal Faith. First, both lines of
thought reflect a pragmatist concept of certainty. Secondly, one may examine the way
in  which  the  pragmatist  concept  of  certainty  functions,  for  the  two  thinkers,  as  a
response  to  scepticism,  since  both  point  towards  the  possibility  of  a  distinctively
pragmatist response to scepticism which involves an anti-epistemological model of the
intimate relation of the human self to the world. Francesco Callegaro’s “Having Social
Practices in Mind. Wittgenstein’s Anthropological Pragmatism in Perspective” seeks to
explain why and how Wittgenstein’s idea of social practices should be considered as
expressing a fundamental pragmatist commitment. In this purpose, Callegaro focuses
on R. Brandom’s attempt to understand Wittgenstein’s second philosophy as belonging
to  an  intellectual  tradition  from  which  his  own  rationalist  pragmatism  derives.  A
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confrontation follows between Brandom and Wittgenstein, whose aim is to highlight
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